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1.  Introduction 
 
 Approximately 500 municipalities currently have cigarette excise taxes at the local level.1  
Municipalities levy these taxes in addition to state and federal taxes, which combine to average 
$2.46 per pack.2 As described in Table 1, the degree of taxation for cigarettes can be substantial. 
Some local ordinances put forth overall excise taxes of over $4.00 per pack, with New York City 
the highest at $6.86. Figure 1 reveals that consumers have witnessed a steady increase over the 
past decade in cigarette excise taxes.  Between 2000 and 2010, the combined excise tax rate on 
cigarettes has risen over 150% in real dollars. Officials cite a number of justifications for the 
increase in cigarette excise taxes, such as the need to raise tax revenue (over $32 billion 
annually) and the deterrence of smoking.3 Ultimately, the economic burden of these taxes must 
fall on consumers, producers, or some combination of the two. 
 Previous literature analyzing the incidence of cigarette taxation has generated a wide 
range of results.  Ashenfelter and Sullivan (1987) find that excise tax increases do not 
consistently lead to increased cigarette prices. The results of Sumner and Ward (1981), Harding, 
Leibtag, and Lovenheim (2010) and Chiou and Muehlegger (2010) indicate that prices are under-
shifted to consumers, i.e. prices do not go up by the full amount of the cigarette tax.   DeCicca, 
Kenkel, and Liu (2010) generally find that taxes are fully shifted to consumers, i.e. prices go up 
by the exact amount of the tax, although some of their estimates point to under-shifting.  Sumner 
and Wolgenant (1985) also find that taxes are fully shifted to consumers. On the other hand, 
Barzel (1976), Johnson (1978), Coats (1995), Keeler et al. (1996), and Hanson and Sullivan 
(2009) find evidence of over-shifting, i.e. prices to consumers go up by more than the amount of 
the cigarette tax. Harris (1987) has the highest estimates, his results showing price increases of 
roughly double the amount of the tax.  Delipalla and O’Donnell’s (2001) study with cross-
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country data finds mixed results, with some countries showing evidence of over-shifting and 
others indicating that cigarette taxes are under-shifted.4   
 This study combines new, author-collected tax data from 443 municipalities and local-
level cigarette price data from the American Chamber of Commerce Researchers Association 
(ACCRA) cost of living index (COLI) to examine the effects of city, county and state excise 
cigarette taxation on cigarette prices. Given the unique aspects of this data, it may be the first 
study capable of measuring these effects across all three levels of government. The local-level 
data also allow for an analysis of border area effects using Geographic Information Systems 
(GIS) software. In addition to the local-level data, we utilize the Tax Burden on Tobacco (TBT) 
dataset to analyze state tax changes and their effect on cigarette prices from 1990 to 2010. This 
dataset has price information on generic as well as on premium brands of cigarettes, which 
allows for a comparison of tax incidence estimates between brands.  
 Our empirical results indicate that cigarette excise taxes are over-shifted (the price of 
cigarettes increases by more than the tax) to consumers at both the state and the local levels of 
government. The estimates demonstrate that a $1 rise in the state cigarette tax increases the price 
of cigarettes between $1.10 and $1.14 per pack. The local-level results suggest that a local tax 
increase of $1 at the city or county level increases prices by $1.07. We find no significant 
difference in the level of tax incidence when comparing generic and premium brand cigarettes. 
In terms of variation in prices across geography, our results indicate that cigarette prices 
significantly decrease for localities within the proximity of lower-taxed jurisdictions. 
 The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical framework of tax 
incidence that permits over-shifting. Section 3 outlines the identification strategy for estimation. 




2.  A Theoretical Framework for Over-shifting 
 
 A standard result in tax incidence is that in the usual static model under perfect 
competition, over-shifting cannot occur.  However, studies have provided theoretical models that 
allow for over-shifting under imperfect competition.  The framework we present revisits 
Musgrave (1959) and Bishop (1968).  It works within a conventional static model of firm 
behavior under monopolistic competition.  Other theoretical frameworks that permit over-
shifting include Harberger (1962), Taubman (1965), Barzel (1976), Delipalla and Keen (1992), 
Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (1994), Delipalla and O’Donnell (2001), and Anderson, de 
Palma, and Kreider (2001).    
 Consider the representative firm.  It faces a market demand function for the good that it 
produces and sells, given by: 
 
Q = D(P, XD),   DP < 0,               (1) 
 
where Q is output, P is the price of the good including all taxes, and XD is a vector of exogenous 
demand variables.  Theory typically does not place a restriction on the sign of DPP = ∂DP/∂P, the 
concavity of the demand equation.  It becomes clear, though, that the possibility of over-shifting 
centers on this term. 
 The firm has a cost function given by C(Q, XC), with CQ, CQQ > 0, and XC  denoting a 
vector of exogenous cost variables.  It also has to pay the tax τ for each unit of output sold.  The 




 π = PQ − C(Q, XC) − τQ,                 (2) 
 
subject to the demand function (1).  With λ denoting the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint 
and λ > 0, the firm chooses P, Q, and λ.  Performing the optimization and assuming interior 
solutions results in the following first order conditions:    
 
 Q + λDP = 0,                            (3) 
 P − CQ − τ − λ = 0,                (4)  
 
and the constraint (1). 
 To examine tax incidence, we focus on the term ∂P/∂τ.  Taking the total differential of the 
system (1), (3), and (4), applying comparative static analysis, and substituting for λ in the answer 












               (5)  
 
A priori, we expect that ∂P/∂τ > 0, i.e. the firm passes on at least some of the tax to the final 
price of the good.  A review of (5), though, reveals that the condition does not hold 








The above condition holds without ambiguity under demand functions that are either linear (DPP 
= 0) or concave (DPP < 0) in the price level.  However, given a convex demand function (DPP > 
0) a restriction needs to be placed on the magnitude of DPP for (6) to hold.  We assume that this 
restriction applies.    
 The next step is to investigate over-shifting, or when ∂P/∂τ > 1.  Substituting for ∂P/∂τ 




QQPPPP CDQDD                 (7) 
 
Based upon (7), over-shifting cannot occur if the demand function is either linear or concave in 
the price level.  But with a convex demand equation, over-shifting may take place.  Moreover, 
given restrictions on the magnitude of DPP that do not appear to be implausible, the conditions 
(6) and (7) can be satisfied simultaneously.  
 To further examine when over-shifting may occur, we express the over-shifting condition 
in a slightly different way.  Let e = −(P/Q)DP denote the price elasticity of demand for the firm’s 




QQPP CPeQPQeD                (8) 
 
Given a convex demand function, over-shifting would be more likely to occur for price inelastic 
goods.  And from a graphical perspective, over-shifting lends itself to profit maximizing choices 
with a flat marginal cost curve, a small level of output, and a correspondingly high price. 
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 Two additional points bear mentioning.  First, the convex demand function associated 
with over-shifting arguably has empirical relevance.  For example, consider the constant price 
elasticity specification given by D(P, XD) = f(XD)P-β,  with β a parameter having positive sign and 
f(.) a positive-valued function.  In this case, DPP = β (β + 1) f(XD)P-(β + 2),  which unambiguously 
has positive sign. 
 Second, imperfect competition appears to play a critical role in establishing a theoretical 
basis for over-shifting.  To illustrate this point within our example, we can easily adapt the above 
model to examine tax incidence under perfect competition.  Then the relevant system consists of 
the demand function (1) and the first order condition for output choice under unconstrained profit 
maximization of (2).  Comparative static analysis results in ∂P/∂τ = 1/(1 − DPCQQ), implying that 
0 < ∂P/∂τ < 1.  This finding gives the familiar result that over-shifting cannot take place under 
perfect competition.       
 
3.  Identification Strategy 
 
 To examine the incidence of cigarette taxation we first use state variation in taxes and 
cigarette prices across time, which is analogous to previous studies in the tax incidence literature 
(Coats 1995, Keeler et al. 1996, Poterba 1996, Besley and Rosen 1999, Young and Bielinska-
Kwapisz 2002, Alm, Sennoga, and Skidmore 2009, and DeCicca, Kenkel, and Liu 2010). This 
econometric specification uses yearly cigarette tax and price information from the TBT as its 
main data source. The TBT has state-level tax and price information dating from November 1, 
1990 to November 1, 2010.  Our study uses the 175 cigarette state-level cigarette excise tax 
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changes during that time period to estimate the incidence of cigarette taxation. The model 
appears below: 
 
 Pit = βSτit + Statei + Timet + εit ,              (9) 
 
where Pit is the price in real dollars of a pack of cigarettes in state i in year t (including all taxes), 
Sτit signifies the state cigarette tax rate in real dollars, Statei is the individual state effects, Timet is 
the time effects from yearly dummy variables and εit is a white noise error term. The parameter β 
is the coefficient of interest in this equation. If β equals one, then the tax burden fully shifts onto 
consumers in the form of higher prices by the exact amount of the tax. If β is less than one, then 
producers take on part of the tax burden and the prices that consumers pay in the marketplace 
increase by less than the amount of the tax. Finally, if β is greater than one, then the price 
consumers pay increases by more than the amount of the tax; the tax incidence literature defines 
this behavior as over-shifting. 
 The fixed effects in (9) control for both unchanging characteristics in the observations 
over time and for common shocks (e.g. a federal tax increase). Fixed effects, however, do not 
control for any time variant factors, such as business costs (i.e. wage, energy, rental costs). If 
business costs are in fact correlated with tax rates and cigarette prices, then excluding these 
variables may bias the results from (9). To account for this behavior, equation (10) adjusts (9) to 
include cost variables.5  
 Equation (10) focuses on the effects of both state and local taxes on cigarette prices.  It 
also includes cost variables.  As described in the next section, data to estimate this equation come 
from the ACCRA dataset along with city and county level tax data collected by the authors. 
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The equation appears below: 
 
Pit = β1Sτit + β2Lτit + Costsit + UrbanAreai + Timet + εit,         (10) 
 
where Pit is the price of a pack of cigarettes in urban area i in time period t (including all taxes), 
Sτit is the state cigarette tax, and Lτit is the combined city and county local cigarette tax, all in real 
dollars. The quarterly dummy variables UrbanAreai and Timet measure the individual urban area 
effects and time effects; Costsit includes wage, energy, and rental cost variables in real dollars; 
and εit is a white noise error term.  The coefficients β1 and β2 are the parameters of interest from 
(10). The coefficient β1 represents the effect of a one-dollar increase in the state cigarette tax rate 
on price, while β2 represents the effect of a one-dollar increase in the local cigarette tax on price. 
 The inclusion of local level data arguably represents an important extension of previous 
research on tax incidence, which has used only state level data. For instance, many tax increases 
at the local and state level take place during similar time periods. If New York City and New 
York State simultaneously increase their tax rates, for example, then failure to include local tax 
rates might bias upwards any estimate of the state tax rate’s effect on cigarette prices.6  
 
4.  Data 
 
 We use two datasets to analyze the incidence of cigarette taxation. The first comes from 
Orzechowski and Walker (2010), which annually produce the TBT report. TBT collects cigarette 
price data through the use of an annual survey to retailers across the United States. The TBT, 
which includes information on both generic and premium brands, aggregates prices at the state 
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level and lists them as a weighted average of the price per pack on November 1 of each year 
from 1990 to 2010. The TBT lists the state tax rates for the same time period. The dataset 
includes information on the District of Columbia and all fifty states, a total of 1,071 
observations. We convert all prices and tax rates from the TBT into November 2010 dollars.7 
 The bottom of Table 2 shows summary statistics for the TBT dataset from 1990 to 2010. 
The average price for a pack of premium brand cigarettes is $4.01 with a standard deviation of 
1.29. The maximum price for a pack of premium brand cigarettes is $10.06 and the minimum is 
$2.09. The average state cigarette excise tax from 1990 to 2010 is $0.73 per pack, with a 
standard deviation of 0.61. Generic brands of cigarettes sell for slightly less than premium 
brands, at an average of $3.76 per pack with a standard deviation of 1.22. Generic brand packs of 
cigarettes have a maximum price of $9.65 with a minimum price of $1.97. 
 The degree of cigarette price variation across geography, as shown in Figure 2, is 
substantial. The majority of states with the highest prices are located in the Northeastern part of 
the United States. The five states with the highest prices are New York ($10.06), Hawaii ($8.92), 
Rhode Island ($8.18), Washington ($7.99), and Connecticut ($7.94). The state with the lowest 
prices is Missouri, with packs of cigarettes selling for only $4.51 on average. Likewise, the five 
states with the highest state taxes on cigarettes are New York ($4.35), Rhode Island ($3.46), 
Washington ($3.03), Hawaii ($3.00), and Connecticut ($3.00). Missouri has the lowest state 
cigarette tax in the United States at $0.17 per pack.8  
 The second dataset consists of cigarette prices taken from ACCRA. ACCRA reports 
quarterly price data on a number of consumer products in various urban areas across the United 
States. Local chambers of commerce or similar organizations collect price data on a volunteer 
basis. ACCRA has price data dating back to 1980.  However, since quarterly data on cigarette 
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prices  in Excel format are only available from 1990 to 2004, this serves as the sample period for 
the  estimated models with ACCRA data. AACRA lists all of the cigarette prices by carton. As 
there are generally ten packs of cigarettes in a typical carton, we divide all the ACCRA prices by 
ten to reflect the price of a single pack of cigarettes. All cigarette prices are converted into 
November 2010 dollars. 
 The ACCRA dataset has a few drawbacks. One downside is that some of the urban areas, 
such as St. Louis and Kansas City, cross state lines. Given the complexity in assigning tax rates, 
we restrict the dataset to include only urban areas within one state.9 The dataset consists of 608 
urban areas, which have quarterly cigarette price data at some point between 1990 and 2004. The 
ACCRA dataset contains two types of urban areas – city urban areas such as St. Louis and 
Kansas City and county urban areas such as Worcester County, MD and York County, PA. The 
vast majority of urban areas (543 or 89.3 percent) are categorized as city urban areas. The 
remaining (65 or 10.7 percent) urban areas are categorized as county urban areas. We include 
both types of urban areas in our analysis. The fact that the ACCRA dataset relies on volunteers is 
another issue. The chamber of commerce in some areas periodically fails to respond to the 
survey, which leads to gaps in quarterly prices. Lastly, the survey only collects price data on one 
major cigarette brand, which limits the interpretation and application of the results. 
 The ACCRA dataset does not include cigarette tax rates at the local level and no dataset 
in existence appears to include this information. Therefore, we collect all local tax data from 
phone and email correspondence with city, county, and state officials. City, county and state tax 
information is available for 443 of the 608 urban areas included in the ACCRA dataset. A total 
of 12,860 observations have all the cigarette price and tax information across the 443 areas. The 
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author-collected dataset includes the specific amounts and dates of any tax changes for the 443 
urban areas dating from January 1, 1990 to January 1, 2009. 
 Since the ACCRA dataset only has cigarette price data from January 1, 1990 to January 
1, 2004, this interval serves as the sample period for estimation. We convert local-level tax rates 
into quarterly weighted average tax rates, to be consistent in measurement to the ACCRA 
dataset. All taxes and prices are in November 2010 dollars. 
 Table 3 lists the summary statistics for cigarette prices and taxes based on the data from 
the ACCRA dataset and the author-collected local level tax data. State cigarette taxes in the 
ACCRA dataset average $0.45 per pack, with a standard deviation of 0.30. The maximum state 
excise cigarette tax is $1.82 per pack and the minimum is $0.03.10 For the entire sample, local 
taxes average roughly half a cent, with a standard deviation of 0.06. For those observations 
having a positive local tax value, the average local cigarette tax is $0.20, with a standard 
deviation of 0.36.11 The maximum local cigarette excise tax is $1.81 per pack and the minimum 
is $0.00.12 Prices for cigarettes average $3.00 per pack, with a standard deviation of 0.87. The 
maximum price per pack in the ACCRA dataset is $8.32 and the minimum is $1.52. 
 Probably the most striking feature between the ACCRA and TBT datasets is the 
difference in means for cigarette prices. The average price per pack of premium brand cigarettes 
in the TBT dataset is roughly one-third more ($4.01 vs. $3.00) than cigarettes in the ACCRA 
dataset. The variation in sample periods may partially explain the difference in average prices 
between the two datasets. The ACCRA dataset covers cigarette prices from 1990 to 2004 and the 
TBT dataset covers prices from 1990 to 2010. Restricting the TBT dataset to the 1990 to 2004 
time period, as shown at the top of Table 2, decreases the average price for a pack of premium 
cigarettes to $3.50. The TBT dataset’s higher average prices, as compared to other cigarette price 
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data, are not surprising, as other studies (e.g. Decicca, Kenkel, and Liu 2010, 7-8) have 
documented the phenomenon. Possible explanations stem from the fact that the TBT does not 
include volume discounts for carton purchases, other price discounts, or coupons; additionally, it 
is possible that their sample is not representative of retailers.  
 The difference in average state tax rates represents another interesting contrast between 
the two datasets. The average state tax rate in the TBT dataset is 62 percent higher than the 
average state tax rate in the ACCRA dataset ($0.73 vs. $0.45). Once again, restricting the TBT 
dataset to the time period from 1990 to 2004 lowers the average state tax rate to $0.54.  
  Given the fact that the ACCRA dataset is at the local level, we can analyze how 
geography plays a role in determining prices. Google Earth software provides the geographic 
center (latitude and longitude coordinates) for every city and county observation in the ACCRA 
dataset. Arcmap GIS software geo-codes the coordinates to obtain precise location data for all 
443 urban areas in the ACCRA dataset. Figure 3 contains the visual locations for each 
observation in the ACCRA dataset. 
 We employ Arcmap GIS software to calculate the straight-line distance in miles to the 
nearest state border for every observation, which means it can categorize every observation in 
terms of whether it is a border location.13 The border location categories include: within one 
mile, five miles, ten miles, and twenty-five miles of the nearest state border. Table 4 shows the 
summary statistics for the distance measures. We exclude observations located in Hawaii and 
Alaska since they do not border any other states. This brings the total number of observations 
with distance measures to 12,788 in comparison to 12,860 in the original ACCRA dataset.  
 In the overall sample, the average distance to the nearest state border is 61.90 miles, with 
a standard deviation of 64.45. The furthest distance to a state border is 378.38 miles and the 
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shortest distance is 0.11 miles. As observations get closer to their state borders, the data show a 
general decrease in cigarette prices. Those observations within one mile of the nearest state 
border have the lowest average cigarette prices at $2.86 per pack in comparison to the $2.99 
average for the overall dataset. As observations get closer to their state borders, local taxes tend 
to increase. Observations within one mile of their state border average almost 14 times ($0.041) 
the amount of local cigarette taxes as in the overall dataset ($0.003). 
 The dataset also enables us to determine which of the observations are located next to a 
lower-taxed jurisdiction in comparison to their own. Here we define a lower-taxed jurisdiction as 
one with a lower state cigarette excise tax in comparison to the combined local and state cigarette 
excise tax of the adjacent urban area. The majority of the observations are not situated near 
lower-taxed jurisdictions. For instance, there are a total of 1,819 (or 43 percent) observations 
located near a lower-taxed jurisdiction within twenty-five miles of their state border. This 
compares to 83 (or 2 percent) observations located near a neighboring state with the same tax 
rate and 2,311 (or 55 percent) observations situated near a higher-taxed state in the within 
twenty-five mile category. Similar trends occur in the within ten miles, five miles, and one mile 
categories. 
 Equation (10) identifies the need to control for business input costs across urban areas 
over time.  The ACCRA dataset enables us to include proxies of input costs in their estimated 
models. For wage costs, we use the average price of a home service call to repair a clothes 
washing machine.  We proxy rental costs with the average mortgage payment for a four-
bedroom, two-bath, 2,400-square-foot house. For energy costs, we use the average price for one 
gallon of regular unleaded gasoline. All business cost data are converted into November 2010 
dollars.  These are the same cost variables from the ACCRA dataset employed by Besley and 
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Rosen (1999) in their study on the incidence of sales taxes. As a robustness check, we performed 
estimations using a number of different combinations of alternative cost variables with little 
change in results. 
 
5.  Estimates of Cigarette Tax Incidence 
 
5.1  Tax Incidence Results 
 Table 5 depicts the results from equation (9), which uses the TBT dataset. Columns two 
and four show the main results with fixed effects. These results indicate that a $1 increase in the 
state cigarette excise tax yields roughly a $1.10 increase in cigarette prices; this is true for both 
generic and premium brands. The t-statistics of 32.93 and 34.68, which appear in parentheses for 
the state cigarette tax coefficient, test the hypothesis Ho: β = 0 versus H1: β ≠ 0. Both t-statistics 
indicate that the coefficient is significantly different from zero at the one percent level for both 
types of brands. In addition, we test for over-shifting based upon the null hypothesis Ho: β = 1 
versus H1: β > 1; t-statistics for this test are reported in square brackets.  The t-statistics of 2.91 
and 3.10 indicate that the state tax coefficients are greater than one at the one percent level of 
significance. This is a strong signal that over-shifting occurs in the market for cigarettes.  The 
nearly identical tax incidence estimates for generic and premium brands suggests that increases 
in cigarette excise taxes at the state level have similar effects on prices from both types of 
brands. 
 The addition of fixed effects causes a large change in the state cigarette tax coefficient. 
For prices of premium cigarettes the coefficient decreases from 1.776 to 1.097 when fixed effects 
are included. We find a similar decrease (1.701 to 1.098) when analyzing prices of generic 
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cigarettes. The R2 is roughly 0.69 for premium prices and 0.71 for generic prices when the study 
excludes fixed effects, increasing to 0.99 when the study includes fixed effects for both premium 
and generic brands. Thus, fixed effects and state cigarette excise taxation explain a non-trivial 
amount of variation in cigarette prices based upon the TBT data. The two most important results 
shown in Table 5 are that state cigarette excise taxation is over-shifted onto consumers and the 
price effect is roughly equal for both premium and generic brands. 
 Table 6 presents results from Equation (10) using the ACCRA dataset and the local level 
tax data. Columns one through three do not include local taxation as an explanatory variable. The 
estimates for the coefficient for state taxation range from 1.136 to 1.660, with all of the 
coefficients significantly greater than one at the one percent level. Inclusion of fixed effects 
reduces the state cigarette tax coefficient by roughly 31 percent. The most precise estimate, 
which includes cost controls and fixed effects in column three, indicates that a $1 increase in the 
state cigarette tax rate will increase prices by $1.14.  
 Columns four through six show the regression results when the analysis includes both 
state and local tax data. The coefficients for local taxation range between 1.067 and 1.369; those 
for state taxation range between 1.104 and 1.624. This means that a $1 increase in the county or 
city cigarette tax rate will increase prices between $1.07 and $1.37 and a $1 increase in state 
taxes will increase prices between $1.10 and $1.62. The range of results is quite broad across the 
different specifications. The most precise estimates, which include both cost controls and fixed 
effects, indicate a $1 increase at the state level will raise prices by $1.10, but that a $1 increase at 
the local level will only raise prices by $1.07. All the local and state tax coefficients are 
significantly greater than one at the one percent level. 
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 A direct comparison of the results from the ACCRA and TBT datasets can be done by 
looking at column two in Tables 5 and 6. The ACCRA results here do not include the cost and 
local tax variables.  Interestingly the results from the TBT dataset suggest a $1 increase in the 
state cigarette tax will raise prices by $1.10, while the same increase leads to an estimated $1.14 
rise in prices as shown in the ACCRA results.  It appears that the data source has more of an 
effect on the size of the coefficients than the level of the data, or controlling for cost factors.  
The point estimates from columns four through six in Table 6 provide some evidence that 
local taxation has a smaller effect on prices in comparison to state-level cigarette taxes. The size 
of the difference between these estimates, however, is somewhat unclear; an F-test indicates no 
statistically meaningful difference between coefficients. 
 If state taxes do in fact increase cigarette prices more than local taxes, then a possible 
explanation is differential transportation costs and cross border smuggling of cigarettes.14 The 
transportation costs to find a cheap substitute may be quite low when a local ordinance increases 
cigarette excise taxes. A consumer can simply drive just outside the city or county limits to buy 
the same pack of cigarettes at a cheaper rate. If the state implements the tax, however, the 
consumer’s transportation costs drastically increase, since they now have to drive a greater 
distance to find a cheaper substitute.15   
 The relative cost of substitute goods, therefore, depends on which level of government 
implements the tax.  Higher levels of government taxation, such as state taxes in comparison to 
local-level taxes, will cause smaller substitution effects. Unless consumers live near the state 
border, it is difficult for them to avoid state-level cigarette taxes given high transportation costs. 
The difference in transportation costs allows retailers to increase their prices by a higher amount 
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if the state implements the tax, than when a city or a county implements the same tax. Our 
empirical results in this paper lend some support for this theory. 
 Notably, the inclusion of local taxes in the regressions reduces the point estimates for the 
state tax rate coefficients. Including local tax data reduces the coefficient for the state tax rate in 
every specification, except for those specifications that do not include cost controls and fixed 
effects. The main specifications, which include cost controls and fixed effects, show the state tax 
coefficient reduced from 1.136 in column three to 1.104 in column six. This result suggests the 
possibility that studies using only state-level data will generate biased estimates if they do not 
include local-level tax data as well.  
5.2  Differences in Cigarette Prices across Geography  
 As previously stated, the level of tax incidence may depend on the level of government 
implementing the tax. Also of note is that geography may account for cigarette price variation. 
Urban areas located near lower-taxed jurisdictions might see downward pressure on their prices, 
since a low-priced substitute good is available to consumers just across the border. To test for the 
possibility of price differences across geography, the study uses the following equation: 
 
 Pit = β1Sτit + β2Lτit + β3LowerTaxBorder + Costsit + UrbanAreai + Timet+ εit,      (11) 
 
where, as in equation (10), Pit is the price in real dollars of a pack of cigarettes in urban area i in 
time period t; Sτit is the state cigarette tax in real dollars; Lτit is the combined city and county 
cigarette tax in real dollars; UrbanAreai is the individual urban area effects; Timet is the time 
effects from quarterly dummy variables; Costsit consist of wage, energy, and rental cost variables 
in real dollars; and εit is a white noise error term.  The variable LowerTaxBorder equals one if 
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urban area i is located within one mile of a lower-tax state border, zero otherwise.  
Correspondingly, we analyze other distance measures (five, ten and twenty-five miles) to 
observe if there are differences in cigarette prices across geography. Table 7 shows the results for 
each separate regression by distance.   
 The results from Table 7, with respect to cigarette tax incidence estimates, are similar in 
magnitude to those in Table 6. The results show a $1 increase in the local cigarette tax rate raises 
prices by approximately $1.07 and a $1 increase in state taxes raises prices by roughly $1.10. All 
the estimated models include cost controls as well as area and time fixed effects. As for the 
distance measures, columns one through four show a pattern of decreasing cigarette price as 
locations get closer to lower-taxed jurisdictions. 
 The findings in column four shows virtually no difference in cigarette prices for urban 
areas located within twenty-five miles of a lower-taxed jurisdiction, as compared to urban areas 
located within twenty-five miles of same or higher-taxed jurisdictions. The difference in 
cigarette prices across geography, however, becomes more apparent when narrowing the 
distance measures to within ten, five, and one mile of lower-taxed jurisdictions. The point 
estimates from columns two and three show urban areas located within five or ten miles of a 
lower-taxed jurisdiction price their packs of cigarettes lower by roughly $0.03. The estimates, 
however, are imprecise; none of the distance coefficients are significantly different from zero at 
the ten percent level in columns two and three. Urban areas within one mile of a lower-taxed 
jurisdiction (column one) exhibit the strongest effect on prices. Urban areas located within one 
mile of a lower-taxed jurisdiction price their packs of cigarettes lower by roughly $0.08.16  This 
estimate is significantly different from zero at the five percent level. 
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 The results provide evidence that downward pressure on prices occurs for those locations 
near lower-taxed jurisdictions. Lower prices can cause higher consumption rates and an overall 
lower tax burden for those individuals located near lower-taxed jurisdictions. Government 
officials can use various techniques, such as harsher punishment for smugglers and tax rate 
coordination across jurisdictions, to correct this problem in the future.  
5.3  Over-shifting 
 The empirical findings predominantly point to over-shifting in the market of cigarettes.  
Beyond the theoretical models from the literature, several other explanations may account for 
this behavior, especially within small retail outlets that sell cigarettes.   
 One possibility of why over-shifting occurs involves sticky prices and the use of tax 
changes as a coordination mechanism.17 Routinely changing prices is costly, in terms of both 
time and money, to retailers. If costs increase over time and retailers do not change their prices 
on cigarettes, then the profit level made per pack will gradually decrease over time. When 
retailers make a price change, they know it will likely remain the same price until another 
cigarette tax change or until they alter prices on a number of goods throughout the store. 
Retailers may therefore increase the price on cigarettes by more than the amount of the tax to 
maintain profits before the next price adjustment. 
 Additionally, a tax increase motivates all retailers to simultaneously adjust their prices 
since there is a universal cost increase for everyone. Prior to the change in cigarette taxation, 
retailers might be reluctant to increase prices for fear of losing market share. The universal price 
adjustment, however, decreases retailers’ fears of losing market power. The tax increase, 
therefore, acts a coordination mechanism for retailers to increase cigarette prices to a more 
profitable level (which is higher than the amount of the tax). 
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 Alternatively, a simple mark-up story may explain the mechanical aspects of over-
shifting in the marketplace, especially as it operates within different levels of government 
taxation. Suppose that the Federal government levies a tax per pack on cigarette manufacturers. 
After manufacturers pay this tax, they ship the product to the distributers. The distributers then 
pay the state and local excise taxes. Thus, retailers do not pay any of the per-unit excise tax 
associated with cigarettes; local- or state-level governments only require retailers to submit tax 
payments as the result of sales taxes on the good.  
 If the state or local government implements a cigarette excise tax increase, then 
distributors may increase the price of the product they sell to retailers by the exact amount of the 
tax. After retailers pay the increased price of the product that they receive from the distributors, 
they increase the shelf price of their cigarettes by the exact amount of the excise tax. When 
retailers add the sales tax onto the new shelf price, however, the overall price increases by more 
than the excise tax.18 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
 This study combines new author-collected data and data from both ACCRA and TBT to 
measure the relative effects of city, county and state excise taxation on cigarette prices. Our 
dataset also allows for an analysis of border effects using GIS software. The TBT data allows us 
to examine possible differences in cigarette tax incidence estimates between premium and 
generic brands.  
 The findings uniformly indicate that over-shifting occurs due to taxation at all levels of 
government.  They indicate that a $1 increase in the state excise cigarette tax increases cigarette 
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prices between $1.10 and $1.14, but a $1 increase in a city or county-level excise tax increases 
prices by $1.07. We find no significant difference in the level of tax incidence between premium 
and generic cigarette brands. Additionally, we provide some evidence that urban areas located 
near jurisdictions with lower cigarette taxes tend to have significantly lower prices in comparison 
to those areas near same or higher-taxed jurisdictions. 
 Our tax incidence estimates compare favorably with those from a number of previous 
studies (e.g. Barzel 1976, Johnson 1978, Coats 1995, Keeler et al. 1996) that have used variation 
in taxation and prices across states and time as a means to identify the incidence of cigarette 
taxation. The point estimates from Barzel (1976), Johnson (1978), Coats (1995), and Keeler et al. 
(1996) indicate that a $1 state tax increase results in a price increase of $1.07, $1.10, $1.02, and 
$1.11 for each of the respective studies – all consistent with our results. Hanson and Sullivan 
(2009), using a difference-in-differences identification strategy, finds that a $1 state tax increases 
cigarette prices between $1.08 and $1.17 – once again, in line with our estimates. 
 On the other hand, our results differ the most from Sumner and Ward (1981), Ashenfelter 
and Sullivan (1987), Harding, Leibtag, and Lovenheim (2010), and Chiou and Muehlegger 
(2010), as their findings indicate that under-shifting takes place in the market for cigarettes. 
Differences may stem from control variables, data sources, sample periods, estimation strategies, 
or other factors. Sumner and Ward (1981) use a first-differencing identification strategy with 
state level price and tax data from 1954 to 1976 from the Tobacco Tax Council.  Ashenfelter and 
Sullivan (1987) use TBT data from 1955 to 1982 and their identification strategy includes the 
use of nonparametric tests. Harding, Leibtag, and Lovenheim (2010) use Nielsen Homescan data 
from 2006 to 2007, along with state level cigarette tax variation across time. They include 
household demographic characteristics in their model as well as a variable accounting for the 
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difference between a home state tax and the closest lower-tax state’s tax. Chiou and Muehlegger 
(2010) use data from a local supermarket chain in the Chicago metropolitan area between 1989 
and 1996. They implement a first-differencing approach as their identification strategy. 
 Our results strongly indicate that cigarette taxes at both the local and state level are over-
shifted onto consumers with some evidence that state-level excise taxes increase cigarette prices 
more than local taxes. Additionally, findings from the geo-coded data indicate that cigarette 
prices vary by geography, particularly in those areas located near states with a lower cigarette 
excise tax. Thus, differences in geographic location and the level of government that implements 
cigarette taxes can lead to variations in prices for consumers. These variations, along with the 
findings taken as a whole, carry important implications regarding consumption levels, the overall 
level of tax burden between consumers and business, and the ability of government at different 








*We thank without implication two anonymous referees and the editor, James Alm, for a number 
of beneficial comments on a previous draft.  We also thank TJ Brooks, Morris Coats, Andrew 
Hanson, William Horrace, Jeffrey Kubik, Derek Laing, Fritz Laux, Bob McNab, Christopher 
Rohlfs, and seminar participants at Syracuse University and the National Tax Association’s 
Annual Conference for helpful comments as well as Kathleen Bradley for editing assistance. 
1Orzechowski and Walker (2010) estimate this figure at 520, while Campaign for Tobacco-Free 
Kids (2011) indicates that over 460 local jurisdictions have local cigarette taxes.  In this study, 
we define local level as a city, town, or county excise cigarette tax. 
2 The average state excise cigarette tax rate is $1.45 and the federal excise tax on cigarettes is 
$1.01 per pack as of November 1, 2010 (Orzechowski and Walker 2010). 
3The revenue estimate comes from Orzechowski and Walker (2010). There is a large literature 
on the relationship between cigarette prices and consumption, with a comprehensive review 
found in Chaloupka and Warner (2000). 
4Evidence of over-shifting has been found with other goods as well.  Young and Bielinska-
Kwapisz (2002) and Kenkel (2005) find excise taxes on alcohol to be over-shifted to consumers. 
The results of Poterba (1996) and Besley and Rosen (1999) also point to over-shifting in sales 
taxes on some goods. 
5Demand variables may be important as well (e.g. income, education, unemployment, 
population, etc.), but local level data for these variables are at best highly difficult to obtain. 
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6On the other hand, our estimated models may not have accounted for all the time-varying 
factors at the state or local level that are correlated with cigarette tax changes and prices.  For 
example, public willingness to accept a cigarette tax change may be a function of changing 
attitudes toward smoking. 
7All real prices in this study are converted by using the Consumer Price Index – All Urban 
Consumers (CPI-U) as measured by the U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
8The appendix contains more detailed information on combined state and local tax rates as well 
as average cigarette prices by state.  
9We exclude nine urban areas from the analysis due to complications in assigning tax rates 
across state lines.  They were Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton PA-NJ Metro, Augusta-Richmond-
County GA-SC Metro, Davenport-Moline-Rock Island IA-IL Metro, Fargo-ND-MN Metro, 
Kansas City MO-KS Metro, Kingsport-Bristol TN-VA Metro, St. Louis MO-IL Metro, 
Texarkana TX-AR Metro, and Winchester VA-WV Metro. Similarly, we exclude urban areas 
that cross county lines where the counties have varying tax rates and those counties with 
different tax rates between cities inside their borders. 
10During the fourth quarter of 2002, the cities of Fitchburg and Boston in Massachusetts had the 
highest state cigarette excise tax rate of $1.824 in the ACCRA dataset.  During the second 
quarter of 1991, twelve urban areas in the state of North Carolina had the lowest state cigarette 
excise tax rate of $0.032.  They are Eden, Gastonia, Charlotte, Marion, Winston-Salem, 
Burlington, Greensboro, Hickory, Rocky Mount, Chapel Hill, Fayetteville, and Greenville. 
11In the sample, 270 out of the 12860 observations have positive local level tax.  Because of the 
small percentage of observations with this property, the estimates of local level tax incidence 
may be less than completely reliable.  Despite this limitation, our empirical results in the next 
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section appear to produce at least reasonably precise estimates of the effect of local cigarette 
taxes on cigarette prices.  In this way, it can provide useful information to local governments that 
may be considering the implementation of an excise tax on cigarettes.  
12Manhattan and Queens, NY have the highest local cigarette tax rate in the ACCRA dataset. 
13We tried to calculate road distance instead of straight-line distance, but ran into several issues 
when using MapQuest and Arcmap GIS.  MapQuest will only calculate the road distance to a 
specific address or urban area and we are trying to find the distance to the border.  We are also 
unaware about how to calculate road distance by using Arcmap GIS.  We believe that straight-
line distance serves as a reasonable proxy for road distance.  Similar issues arose when trying to 
use the population center of urban areas instead of their geographic center. 
14See Baltagi and Levin (1986), Gruber, Sen, and Stabile (2003), Stehr (2005), Chiou and 
Muehlegger (2008), Lovenheim (2008), Goolesbee, Lovenheim, and Slemrod (2010), and 
Merriman (2010) for studies on cross border cigarette smuggling. 
15Other options for the consumer to evade high cigarette taxation include buying cigarettes over 
the Internet, in the local black market, or through a local Native American smoke shop. 
16There are a total of 12 urban areas located inside one mile of their state’s border.  They are 
Ashland, KY, Covington, KY, Cumberland, MD, Dubuque, IA, Grand Forks, ND, Huntington, 
WV, La Crosse, WI, Moorhead, MN, Manhattan, NY, Owensboro, KY, Paducah, KY, and 
Vicksburg, MS.  We obtain similar results from estimations that exclude these observations. 
17We thank TJ Brooks and Derek Laing for providing these insights. 
18Personal correspondence with storeowners, however, suggests that many retail outlets mark up 
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Table 1: Highest Taxed Cities for Cigarettesa 










1. New York City, NY $1.50 $4.35 $1.01 $6.86 
2. Cities in the State of New York $0.00 $4.35 $1.01 $5.36 
3. Chicago, IL $2.68 $0.98 $1.01 $4.67 
4. Evanston, IL $2.50 $0.98 $1.01 $4.49 
5. Cities in the State of Rhode Island $0.00 $3.46 $1.01 $4.47 
6. Anchorage, AK $1.45 $2.00 $1.01 $4.46 
7. Cicero, IL $2.16 $0.98 $1.01 $4.15 
8. Rosemont, IL $2.05 $0.98 $1.01 $4.04 
9. Cities in the State of Washington $0.00 $3.03 $1.01 $4.04 
10. Barrow, AK $1.00 $2.00 $1.01 $4.01 
11. Matanuska-Susitna Borough, AK $1.00 $2.00 $1.01 $4.01 
12. Sitka, AK $1.00 $2.00 $1.01 $4.01 
13. Juneau, AK $1.00 $2.00 $1.01 $4.01 
14. Cities in the State of Connecticut $0.00 $3.00 $1.01 $4.01 
15. Cities in the State of Hawaii $0.00 $3.00 $1.01 $4.01 
16. Cities in Cook County, IL $2.00 $0.98 $1.01 $3.99 
17. Cities in the State of New Jersey $0.00 $2.70 $1.01 $3.71 
18. Cities in the State of Wisconsin $0.00 $2.52 $1.01 $3.53 
19. Cities in the State of Massachusetts $0.00 $2.51 $1.01 $3.52 
20. Washington D.C. $2.50 $0.00 $1.01 $3.51 



















Table 2: Summary Statistics for TBT Dataa 
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
1990 to 2004: 
Premium Brands 
State Cigarette Tax 765 $0.54 0.39 $0.03  $2.82  
Cigarette Price 765 $3.50 0.98 $2.09  $7.15  
Generic Brands 
State Cigarette Tax 765 $0.54 0.39 $0.03  $2.82  
Cigarette Price 765 $3.30 0.92 $1.97  $6.86  
1990 to 2010: 
Premium Brands 
State Cigarette Tax 1071 $0.73 0.61 $0.03  $4.35  
Cigarette Price 1071 $4.01 1.29 $2.09  $10.06  
Generic Brands 
State Cigarette Tax 1071 $0.73 0.61 $0.03  $4.35  
Cigarette Price 1071 $3.76 1.22 $1.97  $9.65  




Table 3: Summary Statistics for ACCRA and Local Level Tax Data (1990 to 2004)a
Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
State Cigarette Tax 12860 $0.45 0.30 $0.03 $1.82 
Local Cigarette Tax 12860 $0.004 0.06 $0.00 $1.81 
Cigarette Price 12860 $3.00 0.87 $1.52 $8.32 
 







Table 4: Summary Statistics for ACCRA and Local Level Tax Data Including Distance Measures (1990 to 2004)a 








Miles More than 25 Miles Overall 
of the State of the State Of the State of the State from the State 
Border Border Border Border Border   
Average Price $2.86 $2.91 $2.91 $2.92 $3.03 $2.99 
Standard Deviation for Price 1.036 0.911 0.937 0.872 0.862 0.867 
Average State Cigarette Tax $0.404 $0.424 $0.422 $0.417 $0.465 $0.449 
Standard Deviation for State Cigarette Tax 0.382 0.332 0.350 0.319 0.291 0.301 
Average Local Cigarette Tax $0.041 $0.011 $0.012 $0.007 $0.001 $0.003 
Standard Deviation for Local Cigarette Tax 0.245 0.129 0.139 0.096 0.012 0.056 
Average Distance in Miles 0.73 2.24 4.31 11.46 86.68 61.90 
Standard Deviation for Distance 0.18 1.37 2.90 7.59 65.60 64.45 
Maximum Distance 0.89 4.57 9.95 24.11 378.38 378.38 
Minimum Distance 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.11 25.19 0.11 
Number of observations located near  89 458 715 1819 NA NA 
another state with a lower tax rate 
Number of observations located near  2 2 19 83 NA NA 
another state with the same tax rate 
Number of observations located near  223 703 1235 2311 NA NA 
another state with a higher tax rate 
 
Total Number of Observations         314         1163          1969  4213  8575 
   
12788 
aDistance is measured as the straight line distance in miles to the nearest state border according to ArcMap GIS software. Cities in Alaska and Hawaii are 




Table 5: Effect of Cigarette Taxes on Price Using TBT Dataa 
Premium Generic 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
State Cigarette Tax 1.776 1.097 1.701 1.098 
(29.02)*** (32.93)*** (29.48)*** (34.68)*** 
[12.68]*** [2.91]*** [12.15]*** [3.10]*** 
State and Time Fixed Effects? no yes no yes 
Number of Observations 1071 1071 1071 1071 
R2 0.6931 0.9886 0.7139 0.9881 
aAll estimated equations include a constant term. Estimations use data from all 50 states as well 
as Washington D.C., with all taxes and prices in November 2010 dollars. Robust standard errors 
are computed with clustering at the state level.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics testing 
the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero. Numbers in square brackets are t-statistics 
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals one. The symbols *** indicate statistically 







Table 6: Effect of Cigarette Taxes on Price Using ACCRA and Local Level Tax Dataa 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Local Cigarette Tax 1.369 1.072 1.067 
(16.31)*** (62.84)*** (69.18)***
[4.40]*** [4.23]*** [4.34]*** 
State Cigarette Tax 1.660 1.138 1.136 1.624 1.106 1.104 
(29.31)*** (34.30)*** (35.37)*** (31.47)*** (42.21)*** (41.72)***
[11.66]*** [4.17]*** [4.23]*** [12.09]*** [4.04]*** [3.92]*** 
Cost Controls? no no yes no no yes 
Fixed Effects? no yes yes no yes yes 
Number of Areas 443 443 443 443 443 443 
Number of 
Observations 12860 12860 12860 12860 12860 12860 
R2 0.3343 0.9740 0.9742 0.3427 0.9767 0.9768 
aAll estimated equations include a constant term. Estimations use data from all 50 states as 
well as Washington D.C., with all taxes and prices in November 2010 dollars. Robust standard 
errors are computed with clustering at the state level.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero. Numbers in square brackets are t-
statistics testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals one. The symbols *** indicate 










Table 7: Effect of Cigarette Taxes on Price by Distance  
to the Border Using ACCRA Dataa 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Local Cigarette Tax 1.076 1.073 1.072 1.070 
(62.28)*** (68.68)*** (70.45)*** (74.33)***
[4.42]*** [4.64]*** [4.71]*** [4.85]*** 
State Cigarette Tax 1.101 1.101 1.101 1.099 
(40.66)*** (40.47)*** (40.30)*** (39.78)***
[3.73]*** [3.72]*** [3.70]*** [3.57]*** 
Lower Tax Border Inside 1 Mile -0.0795 
(-2.18)** 
Lower Tax Border Inside 5 Miles -0.0349 
(-1.12) 
Lower Tax Border Inside 10 
Miles -0.026 
(-1.00) 
Lower Tax Border Inside 25 
Miles 0.0067 
(0.37) 
Cost Controls? yes yes yes yes 
Area and Time Fixed Effects? yes yes yes yes 
Number of Areas 440 440 440 440 
Number of Observations 12788 12788 12788 12788 
R2 0.9767 0.9766 0.9766 0.9766 
aAll estimated equations include a constant term. Estimations use data from all 50 states as  
well as Washington D.C., with all taxes and prices in November 2010 dollars. Robust standard 
errors are computed with clustering at the state level.  Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics 
testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals zero. Numbers in square brackets are t-
statistics testing the null hypothesis that the coefficient equals one. The symbols *** indicate 




Figure 1: Cigarette Tax Rates from November 2000 to November 2010 
 
 
Source: Orzechowski and Walker (2010). Tax rates listed are in November 2010 dollars. All 50 
states as well as Washington D.C. are included in the average state tax rate calculations. 
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Source: Maps created using Arcmap GIS software. Price data come from Orzechowski and 
Walker (2010). Prices listed are the average price for a pack of premium brand cigarettes in 


















Source: Map created using Arcmap GIS software. Latitude and longitude coordinates come from 





Figure A1: Combined State and Federal Cigarette Excise Tax 
 
Source: Maps created using Arcmap GIS software. Tax data is from Tax Burden on  
Tobacco (2010). Taxes listed are in November 2010 dollars. The per pack  















Table A1: Cigarette Prices and Tax Rates by State 





AL $5.08 $0.43 $1.01 $1.44 
AK $7.91 $2.00 $1.01 $3.01 
AZ $6.81 $2.00 $1.01 $3.01 
AR $5.83 $1.15 $1.01 $2.16 
CA $5.80 $0.87 $1.01 $1.88 
CO $5.58 $0.84 $1.01 $1.85 
CT $7.94 $3.00 $1.01 $4.01 
DE $5.89 $1.60 $1.01 $2.61 
DC $7.48 $2.50 $1.01 $3.51 
FL $6.11 $1.34 $1.01 $2.35 
GA $5.01 $0.37 $1.01 $1.38 
HI $8.92 $3.00 $1.01 $4.01 
ID $5.04 $0.57 $1.01 $1.58 
IL $6.20 $0.98 $1.01 $1.99 
IN $5.56 $1.00 $1.01 $2.01 
IA $6.09 $1.36 $1.01 $2.37 
KS $5.48 $0.79 $1.01 $1.80 
KY $4.98 $0.60 $1.01 $1.61 
LA $4.91 $0.36 $1.01 $1.37 
ME $6.86 $2.00 $1.01 $3.01 
MD $6.67 $2.00 $1.01 $3.01 
MA $7.84 $2.51 $1.01 $3.52 
MI $6.47 $2.00 $1.01 $3.01 
MN $6.09 $1.58 $1.01 $2.59 
MS $5.33 $0.68 $1.01 $1.69 
MO $4.51 $0.17 $1.01 $1.18 
MT $6.39 $1.70 $1.01 $2.71 
NE $5.31 $0.64 $1.01 $1.65 
NV $5.34 $0.80 $1.01 $1.81 
NH $6.36 $1.78 $1.01 $2.79 
NJ $7.72 $2.70 $1.01 $3.71 
NM $6.20 $1.66 $1.01 $2.67 
NY $10.06 $4.35 $1.01 $5.36 
NC $4.97 $0.45 $1.01 $1.46 
ND $4.64 $0.44 $1.01 $1.45 
OH $5.84 $1.25 $1.01 $2.26 
OK $5.82 $1.03 $1.01 $2.04 
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OR $5.87 $1.18 $1.01 $2.19 
PA $6.04 $1.60 $1.01 $2.61 
RI $8.18 $3.46 $1.01 $4.47 
SC $5.12 $0.57 $1.01 $1.58 
SD $6.12 $1.53 $1.01 $2.54 
TN $5.17 $0.62 $1.01 $1.63 
TX $6.13 $1.41 $1.01 $2.42 
UT $6.28 $1.70 $1.01 $2.71 
VT $7.18 $2.24 $1.01 $3.25 
VA $4.93 $0.30 $1.01 $1.31 
WA $7.99 $3.03 $1.01 $4.04 
WV $5.00 $0.55 $1.01 $1.56 
WI $7.34 $2.52 $1.01 $3.53 
WY $5.19 $0.60 $1.01 $1.61 
Source: Tax Burden on Tobacco (2010). Prices listed are the average  
price for a pack of premium brand cigarettes on 1 November 2010.  
Tax Rates are current as of 1 November 2010. 
 
 
 
